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REGIONAL GROWTH AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION: 
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE 
I. Introduction 
Until recently most development economists assumed tha
t the economic 
benefits of sustained economic growth would be widely 
distributed among the 
Although there was some doubt about the rapidity of th
e process,
population. 
it was generally believed that rapid aggregate GNP gro
wth would lead to rising 
per capita personal income even among the poorer segm
ents of the population. 
As a result, domestic development programs and interna
tional aid focused 
largely on the achievement of sustained and rapid econ
omic growth. Much 
less attention was given to designing economic develop
ment programs specifical­
ly to alleviate the poverty of the lower income groups
. 
Now after more than a decade of rapid economic growth 
which in most 
less developed countries has apparently not alleviated
 mass poverty, this 
optimistic assessment is being increasingly challenged
. It is now generally 
believeG that rapid economic growth has frequently or 
even usually been ac­
companied by a substantial increase in the maldistribu
tion of personal income. 
Although data on the s:i.ze distribution of income in le
ss developed countries 
are particularly weak, it now appears that the benefi
ts of rapid economic 
growth have not been broadly distributed, but by and l
arge have accrued to 
the upper forty percent of the population. Indeed, so
me studies have sug­
gested that "development is accompanied by an absolute
 as well as relative 
decline in the average income of the very poor."
1 This pessimistic assess-
ment is not altered by consideration of the distributi
on of public services. 
These have also tended to disproportionately benefit 
upper income groups. 
In short, a growing body of empirical evidence increas
ingly supports 
the hypothesis first advanced by Professor Simon Kuzn
ets twenty years ago~-
-1-
2 
that the early stages of national growth are characterized by a deterioration 
in the distribution of personal income. 
2 Both the later work of Professor 
3 4Kuznets and more recent stud.1es suggest tath t heshare of t h e upper 
deciles of the population increases significantly in the initial stages of 
economic growth. Although there is less concensus on intertemporal change 
in the share of the lowest deciles, 
5 recent cross section investigation 
suggests that the income share of the lowest 40 percent of the population 
declines quite markedly in the early stages of economic growth--up to per 
capita income levels of about $300 U.S. (1971· prices). After a period of 
flattening out, the income share of the lowest 40 percent begins to rise 
only after per capita income has reached relatively high levels--about 
$1,000 U.S. 
6 Thus there appears to be a U-shaped relationship between the 
level of economic development and the income share of the lowest 40 per­
cent of the population. 
In the post-war period only a few developing countries have been 
able to avoid this general pattern and simultaneously achieve sustained 
growth of per capita national income in the size dis-
tribution of income. Because of the prevalence of this U-shaped relation­
ship between level of development and the degree of income inequality, it 
is increasingly believed that in the absence of development programs which 
specifically assign a higher priority to improving the distribution of 
income, distribution in most developing countries will continue to become 
more unequal for a considerable time, 
3 
Although the regional distribution of income within countries has 
been less widely studied, empirical evidence suggests that it changes over 
time in a manner parallel to that of the size distribution of income. 
Jeffrey Williamson's investigation of the pattern of interregional income 
inequality, based both on cross section and time series data, confirmed 
his hypothesis that the early stages of economic growth are characterized 
by increasing interregional income disparity, while more mature stages of 
7
economic growth are marked by regional convergence. In particular, his 
analysis of a sample of 24 countries showed that low income countries 
exhibited relatively small but increasing disparities in interregional income 
levels. Middle income countries had the highest degree of interregional 
disparity, reflecting regional divergence in the earlier stages of economic 
growth. Middle income countries, however, were characterized by either 
regional stability or convergence. The highest income nations revealed 
considerably less interregional disparity and exhibited either regional 
stability or convergence. Williamson further confirmed his hypothesis by 
a time series study of interstate inequality within the United States from 
1840 to 1960 which shows a 
"classic pattern of regional inequality. • • during the 
early stages of growth, 1840-1880, regional inequality 
increased••• ; from 1880 to 1920, the degree of inequality 
stabilized and even revealed a significant decline; the 1920-
1960 experience has been varied, to be sure, but generally 
the evidence suggests a secular decline in the North-South 
problem, the rate of which has accelerated from the mid-1930s 
to the present. 11 8 
Less complete long term data for Sweden, Italy, Brazil, and France also 
give strong support to the classic pattern of regional development. Sub­
sequent intensive investigations of Canadian and Japanese regional growth 
4 
over long time periods which include the early stages of industrialization 
have also given support to the classic inverted U-shaped pattern. 9 
Clearly the observed increase in regional income inequality is closely 
related to the deterioration in the size distribution of income in the early 
stages of national economic growth. Comparatively rapid economic growth in 
some regions is primarily a reflection of a more rapid transfer of labor 
from low to high productivity sectors, principally from agriculture to 
industry. 10 Since at low income levels, product per worker in industry is 
considerably higher than in agriculture~ and since a relatively small 
share of the national labor force is initially employed in the industrial 
11
sector, over time such as intersectoral transfer will lead to growing 
inequality in the size distribution of income. In effect, for given wage 
/ 
differences between sectors, initially increasing interregional income dis-
parities which result from differentials in the regional rates of inter­
sectoral labor transfer necessarily are accompanied by a lessening in the 
degree of equality in the personal distribution of income. 
This deterioriation in the size distribution of income in the early 
stages of economic growth will be further compounded if interregional wage 
differences in the same sector are correlated with the level of economic 
development. That is, just as international cross section studies suggest 
that substantial intrasectoral differentials in output per worker among 
countries are positively related to the level of national economic develop-
12ment, within country studies suggest that interregional differentials in 
output per worker within the same sector are correlated with the level of 
13regional development. Thus the difference in per capita output in more 
and less developed regions within countries is due to both the differing 
5 
sectoral allocation of labor and regional differences in per worker output 
within the same sector. As a result, to the extent the transfer of labor 
to the industrial sector is concentrated in more developed regions where 
product per industrial worker is relatively high, the effect of growing inter­
regional income disparities will exacerbate the trend of greater inequality 
in the size distribution of income. 
However, at higher levels of per capita national income, Williamson 
has shown interregional income differentials are gradually reduced. As a 
result of the spread effects of modern economic growth and perhaps deliberate 
government efforts to achieve a more balanced regional pattern of economic 
growth, the transfer of labor from agriculture to industry in less developed 
regions accelerates. This stage of.economic development is generally associat­
ed with increasing equality in the size distribution of income. Accelerated 
intersectoral labor transfer in backward areas will reduce interregional 
disparities in level of development and, because a relatively small portion 
of the national labor force remains employed in the agricultural sector, will 
contribute to an increase in the income share of the lower deciles of the 
population as well. At the same time, the reduction in intersectoral wage 
differences which accompanies increasing per capita national income will 
contribute to an improvement in the size distribution of income and, to the 
extent there are remaining interregional differences in the sectoral dis­
tribution of the labor force, will contribute to regional convergence as 
well. 
6 
II. Distribution in China 
In recent years much of the appeal of the Chinese model originates 
in the apparently egalitarian nature of the developmental process since 
1949. The Chinese in the early-post Civil War period carried out a far­
reaching program of income redistribution which raised the living standards 
of the lower deciles of the population considerably compared with the pre-
1949 period. The most obvious elements of this program were land reform 
and the transformation of private enterprises to state ownership. These 
programs largely eliminated concentrated property ownership as a source 
of continued inequality of income distribution. Several other government 
policies have also had a direct bearing on the distribution of income. 
Extension of state control over the economy included central government 
determination of the structure of wages and salaries within the state sector. 
In industry, for example, the central government specified the structure of 
wages by industry, by skill level, and by geographic area. Through the 
relatively effective control of working capital funds by the State Bank, 
wages in the industrial sector were not, as in the Soviet First Five Year 
Plan, subject to rapid increases as a result of interenterprise labor 
competition. 
In addition to controlling the structure of wages within the state 
sector, the central government has used its control of the level of indus­
trial wages, farm purchase prices, and retail prices of industrial goods 
sold in rural areas to reduce the disparity between rural and urban incomes. 
7 
Available evidence suggests that real wages in the industrial sector have 
not risen perceptibly since 1957. In addition between 1950 and 1974 agri­
cultural purchase prices have been raised almost 65 percent while the prices 
of industrial products sold in rural areas have been increased less than 15 
14percent. 
Rationing of important consumer goods, particularly foodgrains, pork, 
cotton cloth, and edible oils, which was introduced in the early to mid-1950s 
and has continued since, has also served to reduce interpersonal consumption 
differentials. Rationing of commodities whose purchases loom very 
large in consumer budgets, prevents higher income groups from bidding up 
prices thereby reducing the ability of low income groups to purchase these 
essential connnodities. 15 Because of the availability of these mechanisms 
for directly influencing the distribution of income the Chinese government 
like other socialist states has placed relatively little reliance on the 
structure of taaes or transfer programs commonly used to alter the distri­
bution of earned income in Western countries. 
Western visitors to China in the past few years have invariably been 
struck by the effectiveness of these policies in eliminating the extremes 
of wealth and poverty characteristic of most LDCs. Although the basic 
standard of living remains low, it is widely accepted that the Chinese govern­
ment has succeeded in placing a floor under the incomes of all members of 
society. 16 Indeed it has been argued that a fundamental characteristic 
of development policy in China has been its explicit rejection of capital­
ist "trickle down" theories of growth and distribution and adoption of the 
view that economic development is not likely to occur unless the living 
standard of all segments of society is raised simultaneously. 17 This basic 
8 
philosophy motives Chinese efforts to limit income disparities between urban 
and rural areas and to minimize wage differentials in the state sector of 
18
the economy, particularly within industry. 
Evaluation of Chinese performance with regard to income distribution 
remains a largely impressionistic process. However, because of the inter­
relationship between size and regional distribution, a study of the latter 
m~y provide an additional perspective from which to evaluate Chinese per­
formance in achieving broader distributional goals in the post-1949 period. 
This regional perspective will., however, provide only a very indirect 
measure of Chinese performance with regard to the size distribution of 
income. The central government, through its control of the regional 
structure of wages, insures that large differentials among regions in 
value added per industrial worker are reflected primarily in transfers to 
the central government treasury rather than in substantial interregional 
variations in real income of workers within the industrial sector. Despite 
this partial severing of the link between regional and size distribution, 
the Chinese regional experience may still be of interest for other less 
developed countries where interregional variations in output per worker 
are more directly reflected in interregional disparities in real personal 
incomes. 
This paper attempts to examine empirically several aspects of inter­
regional inequality in China. First, the degree of interregional income 
inequality in China is compared to other countries where disparities among 
regions are perceived as being particularly acute. Second, the pattern 
of intertemporal change in the degree of interregional inequality in China 
and other countries is compared. Finally the paper analyzes the nature of 
9 
Chinese regional development policy and the role of the planning and budget­
ary process in alleviating interregional disparities. This analysis includes 
comparisons with institutional arrangements· for reducing disparities among 
regions in Brazil, Yugoslavia, and India. 
Regional Inequality in China: A Comparative View 
Because the Chinese have released virtually no information on the 
geographic distribution of national income, it is difficult to compare the 
degree of regional inequality with other countries. Provincial statistical 
report,, which frequently provide a wealth of other economic data, only 
rarely report provincial national income. 19 Indeed, it is possible that 
the Chinese did not even begin systematic compilation of provincial national 
20income data internally until the 1960s. 
However, data which have been published by provincial authorities 
on the gross value of industrial and agricultural output can be used as 
the basis for a preliminary investigation of the degree of interprovincial 
income inequality. According to estimates based on western national income 
concepts, in the mid-1950s about 70 percent of China's gross domestic product 
21originated in industry and agriculture. Thus the sum of value added in 
these two sectors is a reasonable first approximation of provincial national 
income. 
The first column of Table 1 shows the sum of per capita value added 
in industry and agriculture by province in 1957 expressed as a proportion-of 
the national average. These data reveal substantial interregional inequal­
ity. Shanghai, the leading industrial cente~ is about five and one-half 
times as developed as the national average and almost 8 times as developed 
as Honan, the poorest province. The Northeastern Provinces (Liaoning, 
Kirin and Heilungkiang) and the municipalities of Peking and Tientsin are 
also considerably above the national average. Honan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, 
and Shantung, with per capita incomes of about three-fourths the national 
average, are the least developed regions of the country. 
The pattern of interregional disparity is somewhat different if we 
look at industry and agriculture separately, as shown in columns 2 and 3 
of Table 1. The most striking finding is the relatively even distribution 
of agricultural output. With the exception of the three municipalities of 
Shanghai, Tientsin, and Peking, whose suburban areas had only limited cul­
tivated area prior to 1958, and the sparsely populated northwestern prov­
inces of Tsinghai and Sinkiang, whose extensive pattern of agricultural 
development constrasts sharply with China proper, there is relatively little 
regional dispersion. By contrast, disparity in the industrial sector is 
considerably more noticeable. The concentration of industrial output in 
the urban coastal centers of Shanghai, Peking, and Tientsin is particularly 
obvious. The strategic significance of the Northeast as a center of 
industrial output is also quite marked. 
The greater interprovincial disparity in the industrial sector is 
reflected in the greater coefficient of variation (standard deviation 
divided by the mean) of provincial per capita output in industry as compared 
11 
Table 1 
Per Capita Provincial Income, 1957 





Liaoning 197 409 81 
Kirin 125 160 106 
Heilungkiang 187 222 166 
North 
Hopeh 94 57 115 
Shantung 75 63 82 
Honan 72 30 95 
Shansi 97 96 98 
Inner Mongolia 116 64 143 
Peking 169 482 21 
Tientsin 391 1118 0 
~ 
Kiangsu 87 85 88 
Anhui 81 38 106 
Chekiang 93 75 103 
Shanghai 559 1575 12 
Central 
Hupeh 106 76 122 
Hunan 81 41 103 
Kiangsi 92 .56 115 
South 
Kwangtung 95 84 102 
Kwangsi 75 34 97 
Fukien 79 70 85 
Southwest 
· Szechuan 78 57 90 
Kweichow 76. 30 102 
Yurman 83 48 104 
Northwest 
Shensi 108 59 136 
Kansu 90. 37 120 
Tsinghai 143 44 190 
Sinkiang 133 66 173 
Coefficient 
of variation .60 1.86 .26 
12 
Notes to Table 1 
Calculated on the basis of officially reported provincial gross 
value data for industry and agriculture (appendix tables 1 and 2). 
Gross value data were converted to net values by use of national 
value added ratios in each sector. For agriculture the ratio used 
was .80 as given in Li Ch'eng-jui, Chung-hua jen-min krmg-ho kuo 
nun-yeh shui shih-kao (Draft History of the Agricultural Tax in 
the People's Republic of China), Peking: Finance Publishing House, 
1959, p. 193. For industry the ratio used was .34 as given by Ma 
Yin-ch 'u, "Hsin jen-kou lun," (New Population Theory), Hsin hua 
pan-yueh-k'an (New China Semi-monthly), no. 15, 1957, p. 40. Popula­
tion data are officially reported figures for 1957 given in State 
Statistical Bureau, Ten Great Years, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 
1960, p. 11. 
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with agriculture. As shown in the last line of Table 1, the population 
weighted coefficient of variation (V) in industry is 1.86 while in agri­
w 
culture it is .26. Thus the degree of interregional disparity in industry 
is several times greater than in agriculture. 
Measurement Biases 
There are two potential sources of bias in our measure of the over­
all degree of income inequality among provinces. First, provincial value 
'added data are estimated on the basis of national net output ratios for 
industry and agriculture. Because of wide interbranch differences within 
industry in rates of value added and considerable regional variation in the 
structure of industrial output this procedure may result in an underestimate 
of the degree of interprovincial inequality in the industrial sector. The 
rate of value added in the producer goods sector is about three-fourths 
22greater than in the consumer goods sector. Because the structure of 
industrial output in more developed provinces, particularly in the Northeast, 
is more heavily weighted in the direction of producer goods than the national 
average, the use of the national value added ratio leads to an underestimation 
of the value added in industry in these provinces. Similarly, this procedure 
overestimates the value added in many less developed provinces where output 
is dominated by consumer goods. Consequently the population weighted coef­
ficient of variation of provincial per capita value added in industry systemati­
cally underestimates the overall degree of interprovincial income inequality. 
This is not a significant problem in agriculture since there is less variation 
in the rates of value added in the components of the gross value of agricultural 
output. 
14 
On the other hand, the omission of the service sector, which in 
1957 composed about 30 percent of gross domestic product, may introduce 
an upward bias in our measure of interregional inequality. The distribu­
tion of services was certainly more even than industry and probably more 
even than the combined net value of agriculture plus industry. However, 
a significant portion of services is probably correlated with the level 
of industrial output. This would be particularly true for transporta­
tion and finance and to a lesser extent for trade as well. Thus the in­
clusion of services, were data available, would probably reduce somewhat 
the degree of overall interregional inequality shown in the first column 
of Table 1. 
However, these two biases at least are mutually offsetting in 
direction--and as a result our measure of inequality among provinces may 
provide at least a starting point for comparing the degree of regional 
inequality in China with other countries. 
International Comparisons 
The size of the coefficient of variation of provincial value added 
in industry and agriculture suggests that disparities in regional development 
in China are quite high by international standards. Table 2 shows the 
coefficient of variation of per capita regional income for selected countries. 
In the first column the dispersion of per capita regional income relative 
to the national average is weighted by the region's share of national popula­
tion. Since the use of population weights minimizes the impact of the 
particular division of administrative units within countries, we use it in 
our discussion below. 
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TABLE 2 
Interregional Income inequality, Selected Countries, Selected Years 
Coefficient of Variation 
Count!,Y Years f'opulation 
Wei~h ted Unwei~hten 
bBrazil 1950-1959 .70 .65 
Chinaa, c 1957 .60 1.01 
bIndia 1950/51, 1955/56 .28 .58 
bItaly 1951, 55, 60 . 36 . 37 
d
Soviet Union 1960 .15 na 
b
Yugoslavia 1956, 59, 60 . 34 • 44 
Notes: a) Based on industry and agriculture only. 
Sources: 
b) Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality 
and the Process of National Development: A 
Description of the Patterns," Economic Devel­
opment and Cultural Change 11, No. 4, part 2, 
(July 1965). 
c) Table L 
d) Hans-JUrgen Wagener~ "Les recents modeles 
de developpement dans les regions economiques 
sovietiques," Revue de 1' Est 4, No. 2 (1973). 
16 
The degree of interregional income inequality in China substantially 
exceeds that found in several countries that are treated in the economic 
development literature as classic cases of North~South dualism. For example, 
the disparities in China exceed both those found in Italy, with its well 
known depressed Mezzogiorno.and those found in Yugoslavia where inter­
republican income disparities, exacerbated by differences in nationality 
and cultural heritage, have been an important element in post-war economic 
planning. India, a country that is more directly comparable with China 
because of its similar level of development and continental size, has 
interregional disparities which are substantially less than those observed 
in China. Only in Brazil, where the Northeast has long been a relatively 
depressed area, do interregional disparities appear to be more severe than 
those found in China. 
III. The Dynamics of Regional Growth 
Because very little data on the value of provincial agricultural out­
put have been released since the late 1950s, it is impossible to trace the 
pattern of regional growth of value added in industry and agriculture combined. 
Furthermore, provincial data for industry which have been released in recent 
years are less complete than comparable data for the mid-1950s. That is, 
although all provinces have released data on their rate of industrial growth 
in recent years, the base year for such claims is usually 1965, the year 
prior to the beginning of the Third Five-Year Plan. Only 21 provinces have 
released data which compares the level of output in a recent year to a year 
in which absolute value data are known. Therefore it is not possible to 
assess precisely trends in the growth of provincial national income and the 
analysis presented below should be regarded as tentative. 
17 
There are, however, two reasons for believing that trends in 
regional industrial output alone are broadly representative of overall 
trends in regional national income. First, as was shown in Table 1, 
during the 1950s interregional variation in the level of industrial out-
put far exceeded that in agriculture. Secondly, the annual rate the average 
of industrial growth for the country as a whole since 1957 hqs been about 
10 percent while agricultural growth has been only marginally over 2 per-
23cent. Since industry was the major initial source of interprovincial 
income inequality and has been by far the most rapidly growing sector, 
it is reasonable to assume that trends in regional income disparities 
have been largely determined by differences in provincial industrial 
growth. 
Per capita industrial output by province in 1952, 1957, and 1971 
expressed as a proportion of the national average is _given in Table 3. 
Arrangement of the provinces in descending order of industrialization in 
1952 facilitates the intertemporal analysis below. As can be seen from 
Table 3, there has been a general trend toward equalization of per capita 
provincial industrial output, particularly in the upper and lower thirds 
of the provinces. Provinces where industrial output was initially well 
above the national average, with the single exception of Peking, have 
consistently converged toward the national average. This tendency has 
been particularly marked in the highly industrialized north-eastern 
provinces of Liaoning, Heilungkiang, and Kirin. Shanghai and Tientsin 
have also grown comparatively slowly and as a result have tended to 
converge toward the national average. Only Peking, among the initially 
JB 
Table 3 
Relative Differentials in Per Capita Output, 
Industry, 1952, 1957, and 1971 
(national average = 100) 
1952 1957 1971 
Shanghai 1813 1575 1363 
Tientsin 1187 1118 392 
Peking 458 482 732 
Liaoning 393 409 310 
Heilungkiang 272 222 
Kirin 162 160 155 
Kiangsu 107 85 105 
Chekiang 80 75 
Kwangtung 80 84 82 
Shansi 77 96 
Shantung 72 63 66 
Hopei 58 57 
Sinkiang 58 66 50 
Kiangsi 58 56 49 
Fukien 53 70 45 
Hupeh 58 76 71 
Yunnan 43 48 31 
Szechuan 42 57 43 
Inner Mongolia 42 64 150 
a~Shensi 40 59 ✓ :J 
Hunan 38 41 51 
Tsinghai 38 44 62 
Anhui 35 38 
Kwangsi 33 34 40 
Kweichow 30 30 
Kansu 20 37 28 
Honan 18 30 46 
Note: Calculated on the basis of officially reported provin­
cial gross value data for industry (Appendix Table 1) and on 
population data reported in or derived from official sources. 
For 1957 officially reported population data were used. For 
1952 and 1971 estimates are based on extrapolation forward from 
1957 and backward from the officially reported 1953 provincial 
population data. Extrapolations are based on the individual 
provincial growth rates during 1953-57, with the exception of 
Kwangtung where I have used the adjusted growth rate suggested 
by John S. Aird [Population Estimates for the Provinces of the 
People's Republic of China: 1953 to .1974, Internation~l Popu­
lation Reports, Series_ P-95; ·no. 73 (Washington, D. C: Depart­
ment of Commerce, 1974), pp. 12-i3]. Adjustments were made .for 
boundary changes of municipal governments in 19.58 and 1959. 
have assumed no growth in popu1.ation of Peking, Shanghai, -and 
Tientsin since the time of these boundary changes. 
I 
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more industrialized areas, has enjoyed a consistently alx>ve average rate 
of industrial growth. 
On the other hand, the performance of the initially poorest prc,,.r­
inces has been generally above average. Very rapid rates of growth 
since 1952 are particularly apparent in Honan, Kansu, Tsinghai, 
Hunan, Shensi, and Inner Mongolia. The middle range of provinces, from 
Shansi to Szechuan, however, has shown mixed performance with marginal 
declines relative to the national average for most of the group. 
The long term trend of slow but perceptible convergence is confirmed 
in Table 4. The population weighted coefficient of variation of per capita 
industrial output for 21 provinces declines from 1.99 in 1952 to 1.84 in 
1957 and 1.63 in 1971. 
It should be emphasized that because of the nature of the underlying 
data, that the summary findings presented in Table 4 can be regarded as only 
a tentative indicator of the direction of change of overall provincial in­
come inequality during the twenty year period. There are three separate 
possible sources of error--the limited geographical and sectoral coverage; 
uncertainties with regard to interprovincial variation in the rates of value 
added; and the 1971 provincial population data. 
Most obviously the data are limited in their coverage--only indus­
try is included and for the years since 1957 data are available for only 
21 of 27 provinces. The lack of data for six provinces appears to be of 
only minor significance. The comparable decline in V for both 27 and 
w 
21 provinces between 1952 and 1957 shown in Table 4 suggests that convergence 
since 1957 for the group of 21 provinces is broadly respresentative of per-
20 
TABLE 4 
Secular Changes in Coefficient of Variation, Per Capita 
Provincial Industrial Output, Post-1949 
1952 1957 1971 
V V V V V V w u w u w u 
27 provinces 2.02 4.07 1.86 3.61 na na 
21 provinces 1.99 4.60 1.84 4.08 1.63 3.20 
fonnance for the nation as a whole. 24 The limited sectoral coverage is of 
perhaps more significance. Since the share of industry was only about 25 
percent of g·ross domestic product in 1957 and because of the relatively 
faster growth of industry, it is clear that the use of provincial indus­
trial output probably results in an overstatement of the rate of 
decline of aggregate income inequality. It may also give a somewhat 
biased picture of the particular regional pattern of reductions. Yne 
precise impact of the missing sectors is difficult to assess. The omis­
sion of services probably has relatively little effect on the direction 
of long tenn change in V. That is, while the exclusion of services w 
probably results in an overstatement of the level of interregional dis-
parity in 1957, the growth of transportation, trade, and finance, which 
compose about 70 percent of services, is probably highly correlated with 
industrial growth. On the other hand, little information is available 
on the regional pattern of agricultural growth since 1957.25 
Secondly, the implicit assumption of constant rates of net to 
gross output within each province since 1957 probably results in an under-
21 
estimate of the rate of convergence. Since the composition of output in 
provinces where industry is growing more quickly appears to be changing 
rapidly in favor of producer goods, which are characterized by higher 
rates of value added, the gross value data which underlie the data in 
26 
Table 4 underestimate the rate of regional convergence. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it should be noted that 
there is a considerable degree of uncertainty attached to the provincial 
population data used to calculate per capita output in 1971. Data used 
are based on an extrapolation from official 1957 provincial population 
figures using the growth rates individual provinces experienced during 
1953-1957. This procedure makes no allowance for divergent provincial 
trends in natural rates of population increase or changes in internal 
migration patterns since 1957. Since there has been considerable migra­
tion between provinces since 1957, this procedure is far from satisfactory. 
orHowever, there is no way to estimate the influence of either migration 
divergent trends in natural growth rates. Of course, to the extent that 
migration since 1957 represents a continuation of the 1953-!957 pattern 
the accuracy of the projected 1971 provincial populations is enhanced. 
Since the 1953-1957 growth rates of the more remote regions, which may 
have been the primary recipients of interprovincial migration in more 
recent years, are already quite high, our projections may not be unreason­
able. For example, the rates for Heilungkiang (5.1%), Kansu (2.8%), 
Tsinghai (4.6%) Inner Mongolia (5.1%), Shensi (3.0%), and Sinkiang (3.3%), 
are substantially above the national average rate of 2.3 percent. 
27 
In summary, it seems unlikely that the decline in V would be reversed w 
if additional information to correct these biases became available. The 
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assumption of constant rates of value added contributes to an underestimate 
of the rate of convergenc~ and the population growth rates used to project 
1971 populations contain an implicit built-in allowance for migration that 
is probably large enough to accomodate a substantial portion of post-1957 
interprovincial migration. However, the limited sectoral coverage of our 
income measure results in an overstatement of the rate of convergence. 
International Comparisons 
Hirschman, Myrdal, Williamson, and others have argued that in the 
early stages of economic growth a variety of forces will tend to lead to 
increasing regional disparities. Because of locational advantages, his-
torical accident, resource endowment, and other considerations, certain 
regions within a coW1try may have an initial advantage when the process of 
modern economic growth begins. Hirschman hypothesized that when national 
growth accelerates the greater importance of "polarization effects" as 
opposed to "trickle down effects" would lead to more rapid growth in more 
developed areas and increasing interregional disparities. 
28 Capital would 
be attracted from backward areas to the more rapidly growing region of 
the country and skilled labor would tend to migrate to advanced regions in 
response to greater employment opportunities. Government policies favoring 
maximal aggregate economic growth rather than balanced regional develop­
ment might further compoand growing regional disparities. 
Only at substantially higher levels of per capita income, Hirschman 
suggested, would the trickle down effects of growth become increasingly 
important and neutralize the polarization effects. Combined with increasing 
costs of growth in:,advanced areas and deliberate government policy to insure 
more balanced regional growth, this would lead to a decline and eventually 
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a reversal of the differential rates of growth between backward and 
advanced areas. Thus the interaction of these forces gives rise to the 
inverted U-shaped pattern of economic growth. 
Quantitative studies of Chinese economic growth suggest that the pat­
tern of regional development conforms to this classic inverted U pattern. The 
record shows that although there was no sustained increase in per capita 
income for the country as a whole in the first half of the twentieth 
century, there was considerable growth in Manchuria and in a few coastal 
cities. As a result, the fifty years prior to the formation of the People's 
Republic were undoubtedly marked by growing interregional inequality~ 
However, the reduction of interregional income variation in C\1ina appears 
to have begun at a substantially earlier stage of economic development 
than other countries for which historical time series data are available. 
Regional convergence in Japan, Canada, and the United States did 
not begin until after three to six decades of sustained per capita GNP 
growth. By contrast the Chinese pattern of development after 1949 is one 
in which the reduction of interregional income inequality and sustained per 
capita GNP growth appear to have begun simultaneously. Furthermore, the 
levels of per capita income from which convergence began in Japan, Canada, 
and the United States were a several fold multiple of the Chinese level in 
1949. In short, although the Chinese appear to conform to the inverted U­
shaped pattern of regional development, the timing of the convergence phase 
appears to have been distinctly different from the historical experience of 
the currently developed countries. 
The Chinese pattern also differs from Williamson's cross section 
sample of countries in the post-World War II period shown in Table 5. 
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Source: Jeffrey G. Williamson, "Regional Inequality and the Process of 
National Development: A Description of the Patterns," Economic 
Development and Cultural Change XII, no. 4, part II (July 1965), 
Table 2, for all countries except China. 
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Table 5 (cont'd.) 
Secular Changes in Interregional Income Inequality, Postwar Period 
Notes: 
a. Williamson's findings for Yugoslavia are based on data from 
the mid-1950s to 1960. More recent data show that the population weighted 
coefficient of variation rose continuously from 1952 through 1971. See 
Vinod Dubey, Yugoslavia: Development with Decentralization (Baltimore 
and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 194. 
b. Williamson's findings for India are based on 1950/51-1955/56. 
More recent data for the period 1960/61-1967/68 confirm that V increased 
w 
during the 1960s as well as during the 1950s. The data for the 1960s as 
are in appendix Table 3. Unfortunately. because of numerous changes in 
the number of states and frequent changes in individual state boundaries 
since 1956, it is not possible to directly compare our more recent results 
with Williamson's findings. 
c. Tentative, based on V falling in the industrial sector only.w 
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The Chinese case contrasts in particular with India, the other low 
income country in Table 5. At independence India was marked by consider­
able interregional income disparity, particularly between the former 
British provinces and the independent states. Although one of the goals 
of the federation has been to reduce these initial disparities, per capita 
state incomes have tended to diverge, in recent years both because of the 
extremely rapid agricultural growth in rich agricultural states such as 
Punjab, Haryana and Gujarat and because of considerable divergence in 
industrial growth rates as well. 
29 Although some relatively developed 
states, such as West Bengal, have grown relatively slowly, overall dis­
parities have still tended to increase slightly. 
Interestingly, the Chinese pattern also is quite different from 
that of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, two countries in which the 
state could presumably avoid the classic pattern of regional growth 
through direct control of the interregional allocation of investment funds 
and skilled labor. Yugoslav economic growth over the last twenty five 
years h~~ever has been characterized by increasing regional disparities. 
Although the Connnunist Party in the late 1940s assigned a high priority 
to the rapid reduction of interregional income disparities and each Five 
Year Plan since 1947 has identified specific underdeveloped republics 
and provided special developmental assistance, the country has consistent­
ly failed to achieve the explicit plan goal of more rapid development in 
these backward regions. Average per capita national income in less 
developed regions has fallen from two-thirds that of developed regions 
30 
in 1953 to about one-half in 1970. 
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Although long term data on the regional growth experience of the 
Soviet Union are limited, a number of recent studies have shown that there 
is no trend toward regional equalization, even at the relatively high per 
capita income level attained in the post World War II period. 31 In fact, 
the rate of interregional income divergence appears to have accelerated 
since 1960. 32 Particularly striking has been the long term decline of per 
capita output relative to the national average for several Southeastern 
Republics. Between 1950 and 1971 the relative positions of Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Tadzhikistan, and Turkmenia have fallen dramatically 
--in some cases by fifty percent. Studies· of Republican standards of living, 
as reflected in personal and communal consumption, show wide interregional 
differences and suggest that they increased during the decade of the 1960s. 33 
Apparently the overriding commitment of the Soviet leadership to maximal ag­
gregate growth has mitigated against investment allocations that would be 
sufficiently redistributive to ensure more rapid growth in less developed 
regions. 
This result was anticipated by Williamson who hypothesized that, 
"It seems highly unlikely that the Communist nations 
have sacrificed rapid national growth for the "second­
ary" Marxian goals of (1) introducing industrialization 
throughout the country in order to achieve the neces­
sary conditions for socialism on a nationwide scale 
and (2) achieving idealistic equalitarianism implied 
by the socialist society. 113 '+ 
The mechanisms by which the Chinese after 1949 were able to simultaneously 
initiate sustained per capita GNP growth and also reduce interregional in­
equality are the subject of the next section of this paper. 
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IV. Central Control and Redistribution 
In 1949 the Chinese communists inherited not one but three largely 
independent economic systems. By far the most advanced was the Northeast. 
Modern economic growth had begun here in the 1930s, largely as a result of 
large scale Japanese capital investment. The advanced state of development, 
compared to the rest of China, was reflected in both the high level of per 
31 
capita product and in the structure of gross domestic output. Industry 
and particularly services were far more important than in China as a whole 
and within industry producer goods were especially important. The major 
coastal cities, particularly Shanghai and Tientsin were also very advanced. 
Beneficiaries of decades of foretgn investment, they produced primarily light 
industrial goods, largely for foreign markets. Finally, there was a vast 
countryside where industrialization, with very few exceptions, had not be­
gun. Industrial output in many inland provinces was less than twenty yuan 
per capita and only 6-7 percent or less of their populations lived in urban 
areas. In short, by criteria such as the scruccun: of output and employment, 
modern economic growth had not yet begun. In fact, the preconditions for 
modern growth were almost entirely lacking. Communications and transpor­
tation facilities were primitive or did not exist. China's limited rail­
road development was confined largely to the Northeast; large, populous 
provinces such as Szechuan were not linked with the rest of the country. 
Large areas of the interior lacked other types of infrastructure as well, 
particularly hospitals and educational institutions. 
These marked regional disparities in the level of economic develop­
ment had enormously important implications for the new Communist government 
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that was committed to improving the size distribution of income, to reducing 
regional inequality in income anrl in the provision of public goods and ser­
vices, to creating a single integrated national economy, as well as to sharply 
accelerating the overall pee~ ~f economic development. Although Western 
writers have usually focused on t~e latter goal in their explanation of the 
profound institutional transformation carried out in post-1949 China, it 
seems clear that distributional goals have also been of prime concern to 
the leadership. 
Clearly one of the most profound choices facing the leadership after 
1949 was the degree to which industrialization should be based on further 
expansion of the existing industrial centers. These centers had considerable 
aµvantages due to their extensive infrastructure facilities, large numbers 
of highly skilled workers and experienced industrial managers, enormous 
economies of scale, etc. Continued concentration of investment resources 
in these areas clea:rly n~~~:-ietl thia prospect of much more rapid growth of ag­
gregate industrial output. On the other hand this strategy had quite unfavor-
~hl<P impl-i,..~t-inns frnm t-hP point of view of equity. RPr:t11RP PYiRf"ing inter-
regional links were very weak it was quite probable that such a strategy 
would have very few spillover effects and would lead to rapidly increasing 
interregional disparities. Thus the leaders faced a difficult trade-off 
between growth and regional equity 
The theme of the following pages is that over the past twenty-five 
years the leadership has consciously chosen to sacrifice some economic growth 
in return for achieving improved regional economic balance. This choice has 
been reflected primarily in an investment policy that by and large has 
favored poorer regions at the expense of the advanced. Clearly equity 
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goals have not been the only consideration in determining the regional allo­
cation of investment--defense consideration, material resource endowments, 
and other factors have clearly played an important role. Furthermore, the 
degree to which the Chinese have been willing to sacrifice growth in the 
pursuit of equity has not remained i~variant.over time. For example, in 
1956 following :a reappraisal of 1'.'egional policy, the commitment to inland 
development was marginally reduc~d-;'.eompared to the early years of the First 
Five-Year Plan. However, the pattern of regional growth and the nature of 
economic planning in China suggests that regional equity has been prominent 
in the collective preference ftmction of the Chinese leadership, particularly 
when compared with other countries. 
As was discussed earlier, in the first few years after coming to 
power the central government creat2d a series of policy instruments that en­
abled them to exercise far n;,ac.hir.g direct control over the distribution of 
income. These policies included land reform, elimination of the private 
industrial and commercial sectors, the minimization of wage differentials 
within the state sector, manipulation of the terms of trade between agri-
culture and industry, and rat:z.or:.i::l5 of th;,,; most important consumption goods. 
In addition to these m~chi'i%;:.sms fo·.:- directly influencing the size 
distributi~n of income, the central government has also systematically re­
distributed income and wealth in favor of less developed regions. In short, 
the institutional mechanisms which allowed the central government to increase 
the rate of capital formation from 5 percent in the 1930s to about 25 per­
cent in the 1950s and to control the sectoral allocation of these investment 
resources have also been used to carry out a significant interregional 
transfer of income and wealth to less developed regions. 
The most important of these mechanisms is the annual state economic 
plan. The basic means of determining lhe overall allocation of resources 
within the economy, it is a fully unified development program that incorporates 
the plans of ~adc of t:ae provincial level governments as well as the progrms 
run dir2ctly by th~ central government ministries. In the process of deter­
mining the naticn21.l p18.n, the State Planning Commission simultaneously determines 
the broad outlines of the development plan for each province. These provincial 
plans set forth targets for the level of output of major industrial and agri­
cultural products, the level and sectoral allocation of investment funds, 
increase in the industtial labor force and the level of average wages in the 
state sector, incr®ases in school enrollments, number of hospital beds, 
volume of freight transport, value of retail sales, etc. Within the frame­
work of these centrally determined parameters, each province draws up a more 
detailed plan which includes the economic plans of local governments. As a 
result the naticnal plan is a fully integrated program that includes the 
plans of all iewels of government. 
The national budget, which is worked out simultaneously with the 
state plan, provides the financing for all of the programs included in the 
economic plan. This includes not only funds for investment projects, but 
also for national defense, social programs, and government administration. 
The state budget is a fully unified fiscal plan which includes the revenues 
and expenditures of provincial and local governments as well as the central 
government. Thus provincial budgets are drawn up by the Ministry of Finance 
These provin­simultaneously with the elaboration of the national budget. 
cial budgets provide the financing for all of the oroerams included 
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in provincial development plans. Part of the provincial budget, in turn, 
is allocated among subordinate municipalities and counties to finance local 
development plans. 
Revenue Sharing 
The simultaneous determination of the national and provincial econo­
mic plans and national and provincial financial budgets provides the cen­
tral government with considerable control over the geographic distribution 
of resources. Although the bulk of tax sources are nominally designated 
as local revenues and are collected locally, 36 in the process of drawing up 
the unified national budget each level of government is assigned and allowed 
to retain only those r€venues necessary to finance the programs that are 
contained in the economic plan which has been approved by its superior ad­
ministrative level. In effect, collection of revenues implies no freedom 
to determine expenditures. Excess revenues are remitted upward while 
shortfalls are financed from special subsidies. Because of the large existing 
interregional variations in fisca: capacity and the redistributive nature 
of the centrally directed economic planning process discussed above, revenue 
37sharing rates at each level of government are generally highly differentiated. 
For example, relatively industrialized areas such as Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin, 
and the Northeastern provinces annually remit to the central government from 
50 to 90 percent of the revenues they collect. That is, centrally approved 
local development plans in these areas are so limited that they can be financed 
with a relatively small nortion of locally generated resources and the excess 
revenues are transferred to the central government for redistribution to other 
areas. On the other hand, less developed regions of the country have substantial­
ly lower remission rates. The least developed provinces generally retain all 
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of their revenues and receive additional direct subsidies from the central 
government amounting to up to 50 to 80 percent of their own local expenditure. 
Redistribution is not limited to the top two layers of government, 
but extends to the lowest levels of state administration. Provincial gov­
ernments typically require their major municipalities to remit dispropor­
tionately high portions of their revenues allowing a reduction in the burden 
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on the less developed counties within each province. Counti.es,. in turn, 
finally redistribute resources among individual communes by establishing 
39 
higher remission rates in the richer agricultural areas within each county. 
Because the coverage and specific rates for all important taxes are 
set nationally, provincial and local governments are severely limited in 
their ability to mobilize resources which are not subject to this system 
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of revenue sharing and expenditure controi. Provincial and local govern­
ments can not adjust tax rates or initiate new taxes as a means of mobilizing 
resources independent of central government control. Furthermore, they are 
prohibited from utilizing deficit spending to increase their expenditures 
above centrally determined levels. Only a few Lt::vt::uut:: sources, mainly the 
local agricultural surtax, are administered by local governments outside 
of state budgetary channels. Similarly enterprises have very limited 
access to funds for self-financing of investment projects. Enterprises 
are required to remit almost all of their net income, including deprecia­
tion funds, to the state budget either in the form of industrial and com­
mercial taxes or profit remissions. They rely on non-returnable budgetary 
grants for financing all fixed investment and for most of their working 
capital as well. Only a small portion of working capital is financed through 
bank loans and these are fully integrated into the state financial plan. 
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Although there have occasionally been leakages of these loan funds for 
non-plan purpose~ by and large they do not serve as an independent source 
of finance for enterprises. 
Investment and Structural Change 
Both qualitative evidence for China and empirical evidence for other 
countries suggests that incremental capital output ratios in less developed 
regions are substantially above their respective national averages and that 
substantially higher than average ratios of investment to output are re­
quired to systematically reduce per capita output differentials. However, 
the experience of Italy, Yugoslavia, Brazil, and other countries suggests 
that interregional income transfers alone may not be sufficient to eliminate 
41the development gap between North and South. In the long rm1 structural 
shifts in the pattern of output in backward areas are required to reduce 
disparities in the level of development. 
The Chinese system of unified economic planning and financial plan­
ning has been particularly effective both in carrying out the interregional 
income transfer and in assuring rapid structural transformation of backward 
areas. The implementation of this policy since 1949 has been particularly 
evident in the industrial and transportation sectors. Because of the pre-1949 
concentration of the investment resources in Manchuria and a few major 
coastal cities, 77 percent of industrial output originated in coastal areas 
in 1949. 42 For political as well as economic reasons, the new regime began 
systematically to build up industrial centers in inland areas. 
Inland provinces, which in 1952 (the year prior to the beginning of 
the First Five-Year plan) were the source of only 27 percent of industrial 
output, received 55 percent of total national investment during the first 
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43three years of the first plan. However, this aggregate figure does not 
reflect the concentration of these resources in a few provinces which were 
selected by the center as special areas for intensive industrial develop­
ment. For example, while the ratio of investment in 1953-1955 to initial 
output shares in inland provinces as a whole was about 2:1, Sinkiang, Inner 
Mongolia, Shensi, Tsinghai, Kansu, and Honan during the period 1953-1957 
enjoyed ratios of from 3.4:1 up to 10.5:1. 44 It is, of course, precisely 
these provinces, all of which were relatively underdeveloped in 1952, which 
grew most rapidly during the First Five-Year Plan period. 
During this period Peking singled out 18 "key-point" (chung-tien) 
cities as recipients of enormous infusions of funds for both infrastructure 
investment and for industrial development. As shown in Table 6, most of these 
cities were located in inland areas. During the First Five-Year Plan period, 
these cities, which in 1953 contained less than 20 percent of China's urban 
population, received almost 70 percent of all investment funds allocated 
for the construction of public utilities in municipal areas, primarily 
for water supply, sewer, and public transportation systems. 45 Further-
more, the two hundred complete plant projects supplied by the Soviet Union 
and Eastern European cotmtries, which formed the core of the First Five 
Year Plan, were heavily concentrated in key-point cities. Of 188 plants 
whose location has been identified, 110 were located in key-point cities~6 
The breadth of these plants, including extractive industries such as oil and 
coal; basic industries such as cement, iron and steel, and chemicals; fabri­
cation of final goods such as locomotives, trucks, aircraft, electronic 
equipment, and machine tools, suggests that the development of inland regions 
was a balanced program that combined important infrastructure investment, the 
development of natural resource based extractive industries, and industrial 
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complexes producing a broad range of finished goods. 
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Thus unlike Italy where state support for regional development has 
been largely confined to infrastructure investment or Brazil where regional 
development has focused on raw material based extractive industries, which have 
only limited local income generation and employment effects, the development 
of backward areas in China has included the creation of major industrial 
complexes producing a broad range of manufactured goods for a national 
market. This deliberate development of regional linkages has been an im­
portant element of post-1949 economic planning. 
Investment in backward areas was financed by a long term outward 
transfer of income from more developed provinces. This is presented in 
its starkest form in Shanghai. During the period 1953-1957, for example, 
Shanghai produced almost 20 percent of industrial output but was alloca-
ted only about 2.5 percent of total national investment. This investment re­
presented only about 7.25 percent of the revenues collected in the municipality. 
This outflow of recources has continued unabated since 1957. For the per-
iod 1949-1973 the ratio of investment to total budgetary revenue in Shanghai 
48was only 6.7 percent, about one-fifth to one-sixth of the national rate. 
Although comparable data for other provinces are not available, revenue 
sharing data indicates that other advanced regions have also experienced 
substantial long term outward flows of revenues. For example, Liaoning and 
Kiangsu, the second and third most industrialized provinces in the mid 1970's, 
remit about three-fourths of their revenues to the central government each year. 
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Parallel and complementary to this redistribution of financial re­
sources is the systematic transfer of skilled labor and technical and 
managerial manpower from more developed regions, particularly Shanghai, to 
less developed areas. This program, like the redistribution of income, 
began as early as 1950. Between 1950 and 1956 the central government, 
through its direct control over labor allocation, transferred over 270,000 
workers out of Shanghai. Of this number 28,000 were specifically identi-
. 49 
unlikefied as technicians and 170,000 as skilled workers. This program, 
later rustication campaigns whose objective was to send unemployed youths 
to the countryside, assigned skilled workers to specific industrial pro­
jects, usually in the key-point cities in less developed regions. This 
transfer of enormous human resources from Shanghai has continued since 
the 1950s. By the early 1970s Shanghai had supplied over half a million 
skilled workers to inland industry.so 
As a result of this wholesale transfer of investment resources and 
skilled labor, less developed regions as a group have been relatively rapidly 
growing and the differentials in per capita industrial output, shown in Table 3, 
have been slowly diminishing. Although this decline has not been uniform, 
on the whole these transfers have led to a reduction in interregional 
inequality since the early 1950s. 
Social Services 
The system of revenue sharing and central government control of 
the economic development plans of provincial governments has also been 
used to insure a more equitable regional distribution of social services. 
In effect, although the Chinese seem to have embarked on a program which 
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is gradually reducing interregional income disparities, they have moved 
much more rapidly to alleviate interregional disparities in the provision 
of public goods and services. This process was facilitated by the rapid 
expansion in the early 1950s in the scope of social programs financed by 
the state budget. 
Prior to 1953 rural primary school education as well as rural cul­
tural and health programs, were not financed by the state budget but were 
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supported by· revenues derived from the local agricultural surtax. As 
a result of considerable regional variation in the level of per capita 
agricultural output there were wide regional variations in the ability 
of local governments to provide social services. Because the state budget 
did not yet include village (hsiang) expenditures, the center had no means 
for systematically redistributing funds to improve the distribution of these 
locally provided services. 
Beginning in 1953 county level (hsien) government budgets were in-
corporated into the unified state fiscal system and most village level 
. . c;? 
revenues and expenditures were included in the county budget.~- County 
revenues were expanded to facilitate the financing of village expendi­
tures. Following this expansion of the scope of the state budget, ex­
penditures for local education and other social programs were no longer 
financed from revenues that were closely tied to the level of agricultural 
development in each village. Instead they were financed from the county 
budget and provinces began to redistribute revenues among counties to 
enable them, in turn, to redistribute revenues at the village leve1.53 
The expansion of the scope of the state budget led to a rapid re­
duction of regional differentials in the provision of some social services. 
54 
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From 1949 to 1957 considerable progress was made toward reducing extreme 
inequality among provinces in the proportion of the population enrolled in 
primary schools. Nationally the proportion of the population enrolled 
in primary schools more than doubled but provinces that ranked low in 
1949 were able to expand their enrollments relatively more rapidly. This 
pattern continued into the 1960s and 1970s, although disparities have not 
been eliminated and those provinces which performed least well in the 
1950s still lag behind. Evidence on the regional distribution of hospi~ 
tal beds is less complete but seems to show no similar trend of marked 
reduction in interregional differentials at least in the 1950s. Data 
for more recent years have not been released. 
The unified nature of planning and finance in China, which gives 
the central government control of the level and sectoral allocation of 
investment resources within each province and also allows the redistri-
bution of revenues to finance local social programs, contrasts particu-
larly with the federal systems of Yugoslavia and India. 
In Yugoslavia the decentralization of economic planning since the 
mid-1950s has systematically undermined the ability of the central govern­
ment to redistribute resources in favor of less developed areas. Although 
the center was able to redistribute a significant volume of funds to 
poor areas until the mid-1950s, the growth of these areas was comparatively 
slow. Richer republics increasingly objected to the redistributive dimen­
sion of central investment plans since they believed it had resulted in 
lm·1er rates of national economic growth. 55 As decentralized decision making was 
introduced and the criteria of profitability increasingly determined the alloca­
tion of investment funds, the investment share of less developed fellareas 
dramatically--from about 34 percent in 1950-1955 to 24 percent in 1955-
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1959. 56 After the mid-1950s when the role of republican governments and 
enterprises in determining the allocation of investment was expanded the 
portion of investment funds controlled by the national government declined 
. i 1 57precip tous y. Since 1965 the Fund for the Accelerated Development of 
Underdeveloped Regions has been the major mechanism for central redistribu­
tion of investment resources. However, the financial resources available 
to this fund are relatively limited and the investment share of backward 
58 areas remains substantially below that of the 1950-1955 period. Although 
the Social Development Plan for 1971-1975 has again set the goal of more rapid 
development of backward areas, the relatively slow growth of these areas in 
the first two years of the plan indicates that the goal again will not be 
reached. 
The sectoral allocation of investment within backward areas in 
Yugoslavia has also been unfavorable to rapid growth. Regional develop­
ment in the 1950s in particular, tended to be focused on raw material 
based extractive industries with little investment in infrastructure and 
manufacturing. The high capital output ratios and limited employment 
generation of these projects and the lack of development of complemen­
tary manufacturing facilities resulted in relatively slow growth in 
spite of a centrally controlled redistributive investment policy. 
Decentralization of investment planning since the mid-1950s has not 
only reduced the investment shares of backward areas but has also given 
republican governments greater control of the sectoral allocation of the 
special development funds provided by the federal government. However, 
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this has allowed the development of autarkic investment programs with 
frequent wasteful duplication of existing production facilities. 60 Thus 
both because of the limited redistribution of investment funds and the 
unfavorable sectoral allocation of investment within backward areas, cur­
rent prospects are that regional disparities will continue to grow for 
the foreseeable future. 
The prospects for reducing interregional income disparities in 
India are equally discouraging. Redistributive programs are carried 
out through a complex system of tax sharing, grants-in-aid, and special 
developments grants for financing projects included within state economic 
development plans. However, in striking contrast with Chinese coordina­
tion of central and local developmental and financial plans, in India 
there is little coordination either between federal and state 
development pl~s or between the plan grants administered by 
the Planning Commission and the tax sharing and grants-in-aid program 
administered by the Finance Commission. 61 Ftmds administered by the lat-
ter are largely allocated on a per capita basis rather than on the basis 
of the level of state per capita income. Although the redistributive 
character of plan grants is potentially greate4 they have not favored 
backward states. A recent study of all transfers including plan grants and 
fiscal transfers shows that they are at best neutral in their redistributive 
impact. 62 This assessment must, however, be modified to reflect considerable 
interstate inequity in the mobilization of funds in India. Thomas Eapen's 
studies have shown that the large degree of tax authority given to state 
governments has allowed considerable regional disparity in tax effort with 
many of the wealthier states exercising very little tax effort. Again this 
is in sharp contrast to China where the unified tax system minimizes variations 
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in tax burden among provinces. 
In view of the institutional arrangements it is not surprising that 
the pattern of growth in India has been one of regional divergence. Data 
from the 1950s and 1960s show interstate disparities in level of develop­
ment have been increasing. A recent study suggests that these growing dis­
parities have resulted in substantial interregional variation in the per 
64
capita availability of calories, proteins, and other important nutrients. 
V. Assessment 
In 1949 the Chinese Communists inherited an economy whose regional 
structure, particularly in industry, was quite imbalanced by international 
standards. The gap in per capita output, primarily between the developed 
Northeast and eastern coastal municipalities and the rest of the country, 
appears to have been substantially greater than the North-South income gap 
in Italy and Yugoslavia, as well as most other less developed conntries. 
However, since 1950 Chinese economic policy instruments have been systema­
tically structured to achieve a high degree of central control of resource 
allocation. A leadership that appears to have placed a considerable value 
on regional integration of the entire economy has, in tum, used these 
policy instruments to transfer resources to less developed regions to assure 
their comparatively rapid economic growth. 
The most important of these policy instruments have been the system 
of revenue sharing, the unified tax and fiscal system, and the requirement 
that enterprises deposit virtually all of their profits in the state budget. 
These instruments have given the central government the ability to systemat­
ically determine both the intersectoral and interregional flows of resources 
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throughout the economy. By extending the scope of the unified state bud­
get to the lowest level of government administration, the center gained 
the ability to redistribute resources for financing local social programs 
as well as for investment purposes. Most significantly, however, unlike 
other countries where limited redistributive programs have been grafted 
onto institutional arrangements which encourage basically diverging growth 
. paths, in China interregional redistribution has been an inherent funda­
mental dimension of the planning process from 1950 to the present. 
Although there has been considerable decentralization of economic 
management authority to lower levels of government since the period of the 
First Five Year Plan, the basic institutional roe.chanisms through which the 
center controls investment decisions as well as decisions which influence 
the size distribution of income have remained intact. There is, however, 
continuing dispute among Western economists concerning the willingness of 
the leadership to sacrifice economic growth in pursuit of improvements in 
social welfare. For example, the policy of local self sufficiency, which 
has been repeatedly asserted by the Chinese as a central tenet of develop­
ment policy, is invariably interpreted in the West as an endorsement of· 
growing regional disparity in the quest for more rapid growth. However, 
I would argue that the operative primacy of distributional goals is reflected 
in the relative stability of real wages in the industrial sector, the slow 
but continuous improvement in the terms of trade between agriculture and 
industry, as well as the gradual convergence of regional per capita output. 
In spite of the success of the Chinese in reducing interregional 
inequality, both the absence of adequate redistributive mechanisms in most 
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other less developed countries and the comparatively high cost of the Chinese 
strategy suggest that it may not provide a model for other countries that are 
concerned about trends in the size distribution of income. Although a sub­
stantial portion of total investment resources in other countries is some­
times state controlled, the geographic mobility of these funds is frequently 
sharply curtailed either by decentralized decision making which places re­
source allocation decisions at subnational levels of government or by a 
central government investment policy that favors maximal aggregate growth 
rather than regional balance. The absence of adequate redistributive mechan­
isms in most other LDCs is symptomatic of the lack of an underlying political 
consensus in support of redistributive objectives. Although many aspects 
of Chinese development policy since 1949 have evolved in quite cyclicala 
fashion, there appears to have been a rather sustained commitment to re­
distributive goals. 
Even if adequate redistributive mechanisms were available, the rela­
tively high cost of the Chinese pattern of regional development would dis-
courage many LDCs from pursuing the Chinese model. Although a precise assess-
ment cannot be made with available data, the cost of rapid development of 
backward areas, in tenns of national growth foregone, appears to have been 
quite high. Incremental capital output ratios in backward regions appear 
to have been substantially higher than in advanced regions. Achievement of 
rapid growth in less developed regions would appear to be justified primarily 
in terms of social welfare and national economic integration. Many other 
LDCs are likely to prefer other more direct and less costly means of im­
proving social welfare. 
----
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Appendix Table 1 
Industrial Output by Province, 1952, 1957, 1971 
(Millions of Yuan) 
(1952 Constant Prices) 
1952 1957 1971 
HATIONAL 34,330 78,390 294,420 
Northeast 
Liaoning 4,761 11,751 37,528 
Kirin 1,090 2,400 8,800 
Heilungkiang 1,889 3,930 
North 
Hopeh 1,342 2,805 
·Shantung 2,091 4,068 16,005 
Honan 478 1,737 9,851 
Shansi 643 1,832 
Inner Mongolia 178 703 7,828 
Peking 715 2,307 17,577 
Tientsin 1,850 4,300 15,750 
East 
Kiangsu 2,584 4,553 20,765 
Anhui 631 1,501 
Chekiang 1,099 2,274 
Shanghai 6,523 12,969 48,386 
Central 
Hupeh 956 2,8J3 
Hunan 767 1,788 
/. l'"'\r"'I .......Kiangsi 575 1,249 <+,uoo 
South 
Kwangtung 1,745 3,812 14,138 
Kwangsi 343 798 3,334d 








108 689Tsinghai 36 
446 1,383Sinkiang 175 
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Appendix Table l (Continued) 
Source: Robert Michael Field, Nicholas R. Lardy, and John Philip Emerson, 
A Reconstruction of the Gross Value of Industrial Output by Province in the 
1949-1973, Foreign Economic Report No. 7 (Washington,People's Republic of China: 
D.C.: Department of Connnerce~ 1975), p. 9 except 1971 data for Hupeh, Hunan, 
Shensi, and Kwangsi. 
a. Roland Berger, "Financial Aspects of Chinese Planning," Bulletin of Concerned, 
Asian Scholars, 6, no. 2, p. 16, reports that 1970 industrial output was 7,500 
million yuan. I assumed that this was in 1957 prices and converted it to 1952 prices 
using an index based on data in State Statistical Bureau Ten Great Years (Peking: 
The value of output in 1971 was calculatedForeign Languages Press, 1960), p. 14. 
from the rate of industrial growth in 1971 as given in Field, Lardy, and Emerson, 
p. 11. 
b. 1974 output was reported to be equal to 29 times that of 1949 (Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report PRC, Feb. 3, 1975, p. H3;. 
The absolute value of output in 1971 was calculated from data on output in 
1949 and the rate of growth of output during 1971-1973 as given in Field, 
Lardy, and Emerson, pp. 9 and 11, and the assumption that the rate of growth 
in 1974 was equal to the national rate of 5 percent estimated by Robert 
Michael Field, "Civilian Industrial Production in the People's Republic of 
China: 1949-1974," in China: A Reassessment of the Economy, p. 170. 
c. 1970 output was reported to be 24 times that of 1949 in Ross TerriL.y 
"The 800,000,000: Report from China, 
11 The Atlantic Monthly, November, 1971" 
p. 110. (Citation provided by T. Rawski). The absolute value of output in 
1971 was calculat~d from data on output in 1949 and the rate of growth of 
outout in 1971 as given in Field. Lardy, and Emerson, p. 9 and p. 11. 
d. 1974 output was reported to be equal to 21.5 times that of 1950 and 3.48 
times that of 1965. (BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/W845/A/2). The 
absolute value of output in 1971 was calculated from data on output in 1950 
and the rate of growth of output during 1965-1971 as given in Field, Lardy, 
and Emerson, pp. 21 and 11. 
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Appendix Table 2 
Gross Value of Agricultural Output b¥ Province, 1957 
Millions of Yuan 
Northeast 
Li2oning 2 1,817 
Kirin 3 1,240 
Heilungkiang 4 2,300 
North 
Hopeh 5 4,450 
Shantung 6 4,125 
Honan 7 4,299 
Shansi8 1,4551 
Inner Mongolia9 1,2251 
Pekirag lO 80 
Tientsin 11 0 
East 
Kiangsu 12 3,716 
Anhui 13 3,0281 
Chekiang 14 2,424 
Shanghai 15 76 
Central 
Hupeh 16 3,5001 
Hu.--ian 17 3,481 
Kiangsi 18 1,937 
South 
Kwangtung 19 3,620 
Kwangsi 20 1,754 
Fukien 21 1,160 
Southwest 
Szechuan 22 6,040 
Kweichow 23 1,608 
Yunnan 24 1,842 
Northwest 
Shensi 25 2,282 
Kansu 26 1,423 
Tsinghai 27 372 1 
Sinkiang 28 901 
Notes: All values in constant 1952 prices except as 
noted. 
1. 1957 prices 
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Appendix - Table 2 
Sources: 
2Liaoning shih-nien (Ten Years of Liaoning), Shenyang: Liaoning People's 
Publishing House, 1960). 
3Kirin Daily, 18 March 1959 
4HeilungkiangDaily, 19 September 1958 
5Hopei Daily, 10 January 1958 
6Tsingtao Daily, 5 October 1959 
7Honan Daily, 1 January 1959 
8Shansi Daily. 10 October 1959 
9Inner MongQlia Statistical Bureau, Statistics on the economic and cultural 
achievements of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, p. 39. 
10
Peking Daily, 9 August 1956 gives the value of agricultural output in 1955 
as 73.6 million yuan. I assumed that the total growth between 1955 and 1957 
was ten percent. 
11Since the geographic area of Tientsin was only about two percent of Peking 
prior to 1958, I assume that the value of agricultural output produced within 
the city was negligible. 
12Hsin-hua Daily, 10 January 1958 
13Anhui Daily, 12 February 1959 
14Chekiang Workers Daily. 3 January 1958 
151iberation Daily, 30 August 1957, 20 January 1958 
16Yangtse River Daily, 11 March 1958 
17New Hunan Daily, 4 May 1958 
18
Kiangsi Daily, 3 July 1958 
19New China Semi-Monthly, No. 5, 1958 
20
Kwangsi Daily, 5 October 1955, 27 January 1960 
21
Fukien Daily, 30 September 1959 
22Impartial Daily, 21 August 1957 
23
Kweichow Daily, 8 April 1960 
24
Yunnan Daily, 3 January 1958 
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Appendix Table 3 
State Per Capita Income in India, 1960/61-1967/68 
(in 1960-61 prices [RS]) 
State 1960/61 1967 /68 
population population 
income share(%) income share(%) 
Andhra Pradesh 289 .1 8.4 337.4 8.2 
Assam 328.4 2.8 819. 2 3.1 
Bihar 222 10.1 231. 7 10.8 
Gujarat 402.8 4.8 483.5 4.7 
Kerala 326.2 4.0 335.3 4.0 
Madhya Pradesh 293.4 7.6 305.9 7.6 
Maharashtra 479.4 9.2 474.5 9.4 
Mysore 313. 2 5.5 372 .4 5.5 
Orissa 267 .9 4.1 294.8 4.1 
Punjab a 441.3 4.7 620.1 4.6 
Rajas than 272.0 4.7 313.9 4.9 
Tamil Nader 343.8 7.8 390.8 7.6 
Ultar Pradesh 291. 7 17.3 290.7 17.1 
West Bengal 461.9 8.2 450.2 8.3 
Coefficient of 
Variation .23 .26 
Notes: aIncludes Haryana 
Source: All data from "The Course of State Incomes: 1960-1968," Quarterly 
Economic Report XV, no. 4 (April 1969), p. 22. Coefficient of 
variation calculated by author. 
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